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Letter to General Nathaniel Banks--August 3, 1863

 

 

Throughout most of Abraham Lincoln’s political career he espoused antislavery goals along a gradualist mentality.  His obvious efforts as president were pivotal towards the first permanent actions of emancipation in America.  He stood by those beliefs and, later in life, actions with conviction and a variety of rationales supporting that conviction.  However, his beliefs regarding the status and equality of black Americans (former slave or otherwise) were fluid and left undeveloped in the face of a largely racist nation.  Colonization was the most consistent answer Lincoln advocated for to address what the role of black Americans would be post-emancipation.  The fact that he held this view well into his presidency demonstrated the reluctance or lack of success Lincoln had in finding an alternative to permanent segregation and separation.  Throughout most of his political career, Lincoln was allowed to keep such beliefs and plans undeveloped or inconsistently elaborated because the question of what the role and status of black Americans should be after emancipation was directly predicated upon the realization of emancipation.  But, the events of 1863 such as the victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga as well as the successful implementation of Emancipation Proclamation and the heroic actions of over 100,000 black Union soldiers dramatically shifted how Americans viewed who would win the Civil War and how the War would affect the institution of slavery.[1]  It was clear by December of 1863, when Abraham Lincoln introduced his initial plan for reconstruction in his annual message to Congress, that he had to address the issues of racial equality in a more direct and pragmatic manner than he ever had before.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                      Abraham Lincoln                                                                                   Gen. Nathaniel Banks

 

Lincoln’s reconstruction plans sought to find a middle path between conservative and radical factions of the Republican Party towards reinstating southern states into the Union.  Colloquially referred to as his “Ten Percent” Plan, Lincoln’s Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction offered a full pardon to all rebels below high-ranking Confederate officials who pledged a loyalty oath to the Constitution and to obey the federal government’s laws about slavery—specifically, the Emancipation Proclamation.  Once a state reestablished a state government that had the support of those who swore the oath of loyalty to the amount of ten percent of the voters who participated in the 1860 election, that state could rewrite their state constitution, be recognized by the federal government, and Congress would receive representatives and senators.[2]  Traditionally, this plan was held as a lenient plan devised by a president who intended to offer a process by which rebel states could be readmitted as quickly as possible to shorten the Civil War and avoid any constitutional conflicts over the status of Confederate states.  It should be noted that within this plan while Lincoln ensured to be clear on the preeminence of the Emancipation Proclamation as to protect its effect, he did not address the status of those former slaves nor did he expand the Proclamation’s effects to territories held by Union forces which were specifically excluded from emancipation.  These are significant considerations that were ignored and demonstrated Lincoln’s reluctance to address the rights and statuses of free black Americans in a decisive and pragmatic way. 

 

Additionally, according to Lincoln’s initial plan for reconstruction, the restoration of rebellious states into the Union was contingent on the voting records of “qualified” voters from the election of 1860.  As black men (slave or free) were not given suffrage in southern states in 1860, the reconstructed governments after the Civil War would not represent the freed slave population.[3]  This effect is significant in that it represents a consistent feature of Lincoln’s approach to the rights and status of black Americans he carried into his presidency; he differentiated between types of rights along political and social lines as well as along state and national lines.  To Lincoln, the question of racial equality regarding political suffrage was not one the federal government should answer.  But by relying on the states to manage this political (if not natural) right, Lincoln allowed for racial inequality to continue at the state level.  The question of whether black Americans should have the equal status of voting rights was one that was tested as immediately as the reconstruction process began in Louisiana. 

 

Abraham Lincoln wanted Louisiana to stand as an example to other states in rebellion as well as to Northerners and Europeans as to the success that could be achieved with reconstruction.  Strategically, it was vital to seize and maintain control of the Mississippi River.  Louisiana was one of the earliest states the Union took control of and contained New Orleans, the largest and most important port city in the Confederacy.  The occupation and reorganization of Louisiana proved difficult and untenable under the command of Gen. Benjamin Butler.  Southern resistance from the citizens, especially the wives, daughters, and mothers of Confederate soldiers demonstrated that Lincoln’s belief that there was a majority of Unionists in the state that were swayed by secessionist fire-eaters was false.[4]  Lincoln replaced Butler with Gen. Nathaniel Banks as Butler’s efforts to assert firm and unquestioned Union control in Louisiana provoked outrage and resistance.  Banks was a politically savvy Republican from Massachusetts.  He had a political ambition which was not lost on other commanders and soldiers who served under him who noted his lack of military expertise with the nickname, “Nothing Positive Banks.”  Banks did successfully view the military operations in the Union-controlled south as another form of civil government and administration to which his talents were more inclined.  He retracted some of Butler’s most unpopular measures such as the internationally infamous General Order No. 28, but he kept and modified other Butler programs.  Banks supported a work program that put freed or escaped slaves to work on the plantations in Louisiana.  Banks sought the support of plantation owners in investing in the future government of a reconstructed Louisiana.  Historically, this program can be seen as a progenitor to the sharecropping and peonage systems of the South in the late 1860’s complete with contract systems.  However, Banks’ efforts at raising black regiments and incorporating black soldiers in the war effort in Louisiana were unparalleled throughout the Civil War which demonstrated that Banks saw the role of black Americans as significant in the Civil War and possibly afterwards as well.[5]  However, Lincoln was most concerned with the creation of a reconstructed government with which he could demonstrate the process that rebellious states could utilize to reenter the Union and end the War.  He continually urged him to take action as he saw fit to reorganize the state through local elections that led to a state constitutional convention or the reverse.  Much like his correspondence with commanders and generals in the eastern theater of war, Lincoln advocated action. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abraham Lincoln’s August 5, 1863 letter to Gen. Nathaniel Banks reflected his concerns as they related to the beginning of the reconstruction efforts in Louisiana and later the rest of the South.  Lincoln opened with an apology for his tardiness with correspondence and congratulations on military actions taken along the Mississippi River.  This was during a particularly positive portion of the Civil War for the Union after the pivotal victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.  He hinted at the importance of securing Texas which Banks spent time preparing an expedition towards, but the majority of the letter is aimed at the future of reconstruction in Louisiana. 

 

“Governor Boutwell read me to-day that part of your letter to him, which relates to Louisiana affairs. While I very well know what I would be glad for Louisiana to do, it is quite a different thing for me to assume direction of the matter. I would be glad for her to make a new Constitution recognizing the emancipation proclamation, and adopting emancipation in those parts of the state to which the proclamation does not apply. And while she is at it, I think it would not be objectionable for her to adopt some practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other, and both come out better prepared for the new. Education for young blacks should be included in the plan. After all, the power, or element, of ‘contract’ may be sufficient for this probationary period; and, by it's simplicity, and flexibility, may be the better.”[6]

 

Lincoln acknowledged that he had aims for Louisiana and its role in reconstructing the South, but that he cannot lead this effort himself.  The political machinations for the following year’s presidential election were beginning to take form and Lincoln sought to distance himself from the view that he was usurping further executive  power through the reconstruction process.  While it was clear he was not happy with the failed attempts at reconstruction and the controversy over Congress receiving Benjamin Flanders and Michael Hahn in 1862, he was selective about what he would be glad to see in Louisiana’s reconstruction.  He focused his concerns on the fortitude of the Emancipation Proclamation and expanding its reach throughout the state.  In the arena of antislavery efforts, he was clear and direct.  But when he addressed the issue of how should black Americans relate to white Americans more openly in society he became vague and less confident.  He sought for Louisiana to adopt “some practical system” to alter the relationship between free black Americans and white Americans.  It is consistent with Lincoln’s approach to race relations to provide a vague plan beyond emancipation, but it is a significant development that Lincoln did not mention colonization or sought a separation of the races.  This development could be attributed to his meetings with prominent black leaders such as Frederick Douglass or to the fact that with emancipation under way, a viable and realistic plan was needed.  Although Lincoln advocated and pursued different colonization schemes as late as 1862, he also had commented on the impractical nature colonization as early as 1858.  He attempted to define some of the contours of what such a “practical system” may look like, but they were predominantly measures already established by Butler and Banks—“education for young blacks” and a contract system for labor.  Lincoln did not go much further beyond emancipation towards direct steps at establishing racial equality; he relied on the states to determine how much further equality could or should go.  It should be noted that the measures he did mention he classified as measures that he thought would “not be objectionable.”  He made a clear distinction between that and measures that would make him glad (expanding the effects of the Emancipation Proclamation).  While Lincoln began to support the specific actions of others in determining the equality between the races, he still did not take direct stance on the issue himself.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                            Frederick Douglass                                           "A Negro Regiment in Action" by Thomas Nast ("Harper's Weekly" March 14, 1863)

 

“As an anti-slavery man I have a motive to desire emancipation, which pro-slavery men do not have; but even they have strong enough reason to thus place themselves again under the shield of the Union; and to thus perpetually hedge against the recurrence of the scenes through which we are now passing.”[7]

 

Lincoln reiterated with this passage his longstanding commitment against the institution of slavery.  Like many other letters and documents written by Lincoln, he was most direct and upfront when he spoke or wrote against slavery.  While this is not a new distinction to identify among Lincoln’s statements, it is significant to understand that he did not readily confront how freedom from slavery for black Americans could easily be turned into a de facto form of slavery.  Considering how Banks had taken efforts to ensure that many of the “planter class” in Louisiana were enfranchised and black leaders had already begun to speak out against the dangers of the “contract system,” one can easily see how ending slavery was not enough.[8]  During his time as president, Lincoln saw inequality in treatment between black soldiers and white soldiers.  Receiving half the pay of white soldiers while also restricted from promotion for distinguished service, the federal government also participated in sustaining a system of inequality amongst the races.  While these circumstances bothered Lincoln, he was not as open and direct in confronting those circumstances as he was about the institution of slavery.[9]  While Lincoln had his own motivations for his antislavery beliefs, he recognized the difficulty of incorporating unwilling participants into a reconstructed Louisiana government that enforced emancipation.  He relied on the horrors of the Civil War to motivate all to come “under the shield of the Union” to support emancipation lest war be risked again.  It is in this line of thought that Lincoln demonstrated that preserving the Union was intrinsically connected to the abolition of slavery and emancipation of the slaves. 

 

“Gov. Shepley has informed me that Mr. Durant is now taking a registry, with a view to the election of a Constitutional convention in Louisiana. This, to me, appears proper. If such convention were to ask my views, I could present little else than what I now say to you. I think the thing should be pushed forward, so that if possible, it's mature work may reach here by the meeting of Congress.

 

For my own part I think I shall not, in any event, retract the emancipation proclamation; nor, as executive, ever return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.

 

If Louisiana shall send members to Congress, their admission to seats will depend, as you know, upon the respective Houses, and not upon the President.

 

If these views can be of any advantage in giving shape, and impetus, to action there, I shall be glad for you to use them prudently for that object. Of course you will confer with intelligent and trusty citizens of the State, among whom I would suggest Messrs. Flanders, Hahn, and Durant; and to each of whom I now think I may send copies of this letter. Still it is perhaps better to not make the letter generally public.”[10]

 

The rest of the letter to Gen. Banks was spent in fortifying reassurances as to the future process of reconstruction in Louisiana, and thus to reconstruction perhaps in a more widespread form.  Lincoln made clear distinctions between the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal government in determining how the future state constitution of Louisiana and its representatives will be received in Congress.  Lincoln offered his support, but not his guarantee.  A not-so-ulterior motive of this letter was to better distinguish the boundaries of the Executive in shaping the governments of the states.  Democrats and Republicans alike criticized Lincoln’s use of Executive authority and he foresaw this as a possible line of attack in the 1864.[1]  Likewise, he also reassured that he would not (for his part) walk back the measures of emancipation.  Any endeavors and action taken towards a new constitution and government must consider and enforce the Emancipation Proclamation, to which Lincoln reminded Banks.  Lastly, he reassured Banks that he must act.  He consistently reminded Banks to take action—get voters registered, form a constitutional convention, establish a state government, etc.  This is reminiscent of other letters Lincoln wrote to generals throughout the Civil War to take action and risk harm than to take no action and ensure continued harm.  Michael Burlingame cited and differentiated between Lincoln’s letter to Banks and the copies of the private letter he provided for members of the Free State Committee in Louisiana like Michael Hahn and Benjamin Flanders that, “. . . he added the endorsement: ‘Please observe my directions to him.’ Significantly he did not say suggestions but rather directions. Banks replied that he would execute Lincoln’s orders. He did not say suggestions.”[12]  It was ambiguities and contradictions such as these that triggered opposition in Congress against initiatives from the Executive Branch in fostering reconstructed governments.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                               Benjamin Flanders                                                                                                 New Orleans, Louisiana

 

Abraham Lincoln as president continued the pattern of distinguishing between emancipation and abolition of slavery and the maintenance of racial equality.  These were separate issues and the former was the issue he considered more important and most under his purview.  However, this document stands as significant in that it is clear that Lincoln retired the use of colonization as a cure-all for when emancipation did arrive.[13]  Additionally, it is clear that whatever form reconstruction would take in the South, it will have direct and immediate effects on racial equality in a post-emancipation society.  Lincoln saw that reality and understood that through reconstruction both races would “gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other,” however he did not define what he thought that new biracial society may look like or how the races should view themselves.  In this reluctance to clearly define his views of how the races should exist with each other, President Lincoln is consistent with candidate-for-Senate Lincoln and Representative Lincoln. 

 

 

 

[1] Donald, David Herbert.  Lincoln.  New York City:  Simon & Schuster, 1995.  Print.  467-468

 

[2] Donald, David Herbert.  Lincoln.  New York City:  Simon & Schuster, 1995.  Print.  471-472

 

[3] Singer, Alan J. "Abraham Lincoln Never Believed in Racial Equality." History News Network. George Mason University, 13 Nov. 2013. Web. 14 July 2014.

 

[4] McCurry, Stephanie. “Women Numerous and Armed:  The Confederate Food Riots in Historical Perspective.” OAH Magazine of history, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2013): 35-39

 

[5] Dawson, Joseph. Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana 1862–1877. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 11-14

 

[6] Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Nathaniel P. Banks [August 5, 1863], Roy Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 vols., New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 6: 365-366

 

[7] Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Nathaniel P. Banks [August 5, 1863], Roy Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 vols., New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 6: 365-366

 

[8] Donald, David Herbert.  Lincoln.  New York City:  Simon & Schuster, 1995.  Print.  485-487

 

[9] Oakes, James.  “Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, State Rights, and Black Rights:  Another Look at Lincoln and Race.”  History Now 18 (Winter 2008): Web. 07-14-14

 

[10] Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Nathaniel P. Banks [August 5, 1863], Roy Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 vols., New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 6: 365-366

 

[11] Donald, David Herbert.  Lincoln.  New York City:  Simon & Schuster, 1995.  Print.  478-483

 

[12] Burlingame, Michael.  Abraham Lincoln: A Life—Unedited Manuscript Vol. 2. Chapter 32 Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. Web. 3516

 

[13] Foner, Eric.  “The Emancipation of Abe Lincoln.”  New York Times 31 December 2012: Print.

 

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